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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VINCENT CHIODO, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
BEAR RIVER TELEPHONE 
COMPANY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
10473 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
This reply brief is filed pursuant to the provisions 
of Rule 75 (p) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and will be limited to answering new matters set forth 
in respondent's brief. 
Argument 
I. THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT IN 
(~lTESTION 'VAS NOT AN ANNUNITY AND 
WAS TERMINABLE FOR GOOD CAUSE. 
1 
Although respondent under the "Statement Of 
Kind Of Case" (Br. 1-2) states that his contention 
at the trial level was that the contract in question pro-
vided him "a guaranteed employment for 10 years 
with no right in Bear River to terminate his employment 
or, at least, the payments required thereunder" this 
contention is not an issue before this Court. Respondent 
agrees under point 1 of his argument (Br. 20) that 
the trial court did determine that the employment agree-
ment could be terminated for good cause and while he 
wistfully recalls this theory (Br. 22 and 55-56), the 
respondent has not attempted to contest the trial court's 
determination and has taken no cross appeal on this 
issue. It is, therefore, clear that the primary issue 
before this Court is whether Vincent Chiodo's actions 
as established by defendant-appellant constitute legal 
justification for the termination of his employment 
contract. 
II. THE FINDINGS OF FACT DO NOT 
MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 52 
OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCE-
DURE AND MUST BE CONSIDERED TO-
GETHER 'VITH THE ORAL OPINION OF 
THE COURT BELOW. 
Respondent, on page 44 of his brief, cites this 
Court's opinion in Wasatch Oil Refining Co. v. Wade, 
92 Utah 50, 63 P.2d 1070, 1075 (1936), for the propo· 
sition that the oral or written opinion of the trial court 
cannot be looked to to ascertain what the trial court 
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has decided once findings have been entered. In that 
case, decided long before Rule 52 was adopted, the 
trial court had not made any findings and this Court 
concluded that no reviewable decision had been entered 
until findings and a judgment were made and filed. 
It also stated that the oral opinion of the Court could 
not be substituted for findings. However, it neither 
said nor implied that inadequate findings could not be 
examined in light of the court's oral opinion, for such 
is not the law. Sprague v. Boyles Bros. Drilling Co., 
4 Utah 2d 344, 294 P.2d 689 (1956). 
There are two basic reasons why respondent's claim 
of sanctity for the Findings in this case is without merit 
-both having their basis in Rule 52, Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
In the first place the findings were prepared by 
counsel for plaintiff and adopted verbatim by the trial 
court. The Supreme Court of the United States has 
recently commented on this aspect of appellate review 
of findings drafted by counsel and mechanically adopted 
by the trial court contrary to the provisions of Rule 
52, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which is similar 
to Utah Rule 52. 
In United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 
U.S. 651, 656-657 (1964), the Court said: 
"There was a trial, and after oral argument 
the judge announced from the bench that judg-
ment would be for appellees and that he would 
not write an opinion. He told counsel for ap-
3 
pellees 'Prepare the findings and conclusiou~ 
and judgment.' They obeyed, submitting 130 
findings of fact and one conclusion of law, all 
of which, we are advised, the District Court 
adopted verbatim. Those findings, though not 
the product of the workings of the district 
judge's mind, are formally his; they are not to 
be rejected out-of-hand, and they will stand if 
supported by evidence. United States v. Cres-
cent Amusement Co., 323 US 173, 184-185, 89 
L ed 160, 169, 65 S Ct 254. Those drawn with 
the insight of a disinterested mind are, however, 
more helpful to the appellate court.4 See 2B 
Barron and Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Pro-
cedure (Wright ed. 1961} § ll24. Moreover, 
these detailed findings were 'mechanically adopt-
ed,' to use the phrase of the late Judge Frank 
in United States v. Forness, 125 F2d 928, 942, 
and do not reveal the discerning line for deci-
sion of the basic issue in the case." 
Footnote 4 to the opinion is as follows: 
"4. Judge J. Skelly Wright of the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia recently 
said: 
" 'Who shall prepare the findings? Rule 52 
says the court shall prepare the findings. "The 
court shall find the facts specially and state 
separately its conclusions of law." We all know 
what has happened. Many courts simply de-
cide the case in favor of the plaintiff or the 
defendant, have him prepare the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law and sign them. 
This has been denounced by every court of 
appeals save one. This is an abandonment of 
the duty and the trust that has been placed 
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in the judge by these rules. It is a noncom-
pliance with Rule 52 specifically and it betrays 
the primary purpose of Rule 52-the primary 
purpose being that the preparation of these 
findings by the judge shall assist in the adjudi-
cation of the lawsuit. 
" 'I suggest to you strongly that you avoid 
as far as you possibly can simply signing what 
some lawyer puts under your nose. These law-
yers, and properly so, in their zeal and advo-
cacy and their enthusiasm are going to state 
the case for their side in these findings as 
strongly as they possibly can. 'Vhen these 
findings get to the courts of appeal they won't 
be worth the paper they are written on as far 
as assisting the court of appeal in determining 
why the judge decided the case.' Seminars for 
Newly Appointed United States District 
Judges (1963), p. 166." 
While the factual findings of the trial court are 
not to be rejected "out-of-hand" if supported by evi-
dence, appellant does not so contend with respect to 
the so-called "findings" in this case. This points up the 
second failure of the findings to meet the requirements 
of Rule 52. The findings do not include any specific 
or direct findings on the fundamental issues of fact 
before the court which the rules require. Harmon v. 
Rasmussen, 13 Utah 2d 422, 375 P.2d 762 (1962); 
Gaddis Investment Co. v. Morrison, 3 Utah 2d 43, 278 
P.2d 284 (1954); Featherstone v. Barash, 345 F.2d 
246 (10th Cir. 1965). It is appellant's position that the 
trial court made no finding of fact with regard to the 
specific conduct of Vincent Chiodo on which appellant 
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relied as justification for the discharge of Vincent c 
Chiodo. The trial court could not, in fact, find that 
Vincent Chiodo had not engaged in the alleged con. c 
duct because the evidence of such conduct is clear. 'i\That 2 
the trial court did was to conclude that the actions of 
Vincent Chiodo did not provide a legal basis for his 
discharge-in light of the community morals at the 
time. Even the findings prepared by respondent's coun· 
sel do not purport to find, as a fact, that the alleged 
conduct of Vincent Chiodo did not occur. Said find· 
ings merely conclude that Vincent Chiodo was dis· 
charged "without just cause and excuse." This con-
clusion is a result of the trial court's erroneous view 
of the law applicable to termination of employment . 
contracts having a specified duration. 
Appellant can hardly attack the findings of fact as 
to the specific conduct of Vincent Chiodo because there 
are no such findings. If findings had been prepared by 
respondent's counsel and they had been contrary to the 
facts as shown by the evidence then they would have . 
been attacked on that ground. Defendant did file its 
"Objections to Plaintiff's Proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and to the Proposed Judg· · 
ment" (R. 678) in an effort to cause the court to make 
findings relating to specific conduct of Vincent Chiodo. 
However, these objections were overruled "out-of· 
hand" and the findings prepared by plaintiff's counsel 
were "mechanically adopted." 
It is recognized that what Vincent Chiodo did or 
did not do is a matter of fact, but the legal consequence 
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of such acts is clearly a matter of law. There are no find-
ings of fact relating to the specific charges of misconduct 
of Vincent Chiodo and, therefore, this Court should 
and must look to the underlying evidence. It is appel-
lant's position that its discharge of Vincent Chiodo was 
legally justifiable because of his proven misconduct 
as outlined in our opening brief. The trial court made 
no finding that such conduct did not in fact occur, but 
in its oral opinion attempted to find a legal excuse for 
its general conclusion that despite such conduct on his 
part plaintiff was entitled to recover. Appellant sub-
mits the trial court erred as a matter of law in concluding 
that no justifiable cause existed for the discharge of 
Vincent Chiodo. 
The failure of counsel for plaintiff to prepare and 
submit specific :findings of fact as required by Rule 52 
could be attributed either to a fear that following the 
court's oral opinion in framing :findings of fact and 
conclusions of law would expose all too clearly the 
court's erroneous view of the law or to a concern that 
specific findings in accord with the conclusions of law 
would result in :findings of fact that the trial court would 
reject as contrary to its view of the evidence. The result-
ing camouflage of generalities is not entitled to be re-
garded as a shield to preclude this court from finding 
and correcting the erroneous conclusions of law of the 
court below. 
A recent opinion of the Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit, written by District Judge Christensen, 
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reviews the requirements for findings under Rule 52. 
Featherstone v. Barash, supra p. 5. Judge Christen-
sen concludes at page 250: 
"And when findings wholly fail to resolve in 
any meaningful way the basic issues of fact in 
dispute, they become clearly insufficient to per-
mit the reviewing court to decide the case at all, 
except to remand it for proper findings by the 
trial court." 
This step is not necessary in the case at bar as this 
court has before it the oral opinion of the trial court 
which may be considered together with the findings. 
Sprague v. Boyles Bros. Drilling Co., 4 Utah 2d 344, 
294 P .2d 689 ( 1956). This court there noted that where 
the findings are inadequate, as they are in the case at 
bar, an opinion or memorandum of decision of the trial 
court may be consulted. Such resort to the oral opinion 
of Judge Jones announcing the basis for his conclusion 
that plaintiff should recover (R. 588-592} clearly shows 
the errors of law committed below. 
III. THE ACTIONS OF VINCENT CHI-
ODO DURING THE COURSE OF HIS EM-
PLOYMENT WERE INCONSISTENT WITH 
THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT. 
A. Payroll Padding. 
Respondent's brief demonstrates an ability to 
rationalize and find excuses for conduct which is gen-
erally regarded by right thinking people as improper 
and dishonest. The most striking example of this ability 
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is respondent's efforts to gloss over the documentary 
evidence of falsification of payroll records by Vincent 
Chiodo for his son, Don Chiodo. 
On page 25 of his brief, respondent argues that 
while it is true that the payroll records of Bear River 
Telephone Company were falsified by Vincent Chiodo 
and by Mr. Staples at the direction of Vincent Chiodo, 
this falsification was justified because of "the answering 
testimony . . . that Don Chiodo had time coming to 
him because of work that he had been required to do 
for Bear River during his vacation period and some 
extensive night work which he had performed for Bear 
River without charge." 
Even if this excuse were accepted as being true, 
which it is not, it would not justify the preparation of 
what was patently a false and fraudulently written 
report. If Don Chiodo had time coming, his time record, 
while he was absent from the state, could very well have 
shown his contention without the obvious and deliberate 
falsification of company records. The very fact that the 
plaintiff is trapped by written evidence of his willing-
ness to change facts to support his own purposes is 
strong evidence that the other testimony introduced by 
him is suspect. 
In a strained effort to show that it was not wrong-
ful for Vincent Chiodo to falsify payroll records, def en-
dant points to the testimony of Mr. Staples who testi-
fied that Vincent Chiodo told him to tell the truth if he 
was ever called as a witness. It is really rather amazing 
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that plaintiff can hope to prove a fact by taking two 
entirely unrelated statements - bring them together as 
one and prove the desired fact. It is true that Mr. Staples 
testified that Vincent Chiodo told him and other em-
ployees to tell the truth when Vincent Chiodo was 
telling them that he was going to have a court battle 
over his contract as early as six months after he sold his 
Bear River Telephone Company stock to General 
Waterworks Corporation (R. 324). It is entirely un-
true that Vincent Chiodo ever told Mr. Staples to tell 
the truth regarding his fraudulent reporting of Don 
Chiodo's time and it was only through the process of 
discovery that this fact was ascertained by defendant. 
There is no evidence that there was anything whatever 
said to Mr. Staples by Vincent Chiodo with respect to 
the false payroll reporting except to instruct him what 
to write down. 
The excuse proposed by plaintiff, that Don Chiodo 
had time coming, is not supported by anything stronger 
than Don Chiodo's self-serving declaration that he was 
diligent and worked many hours overtime. The record 
(Ex. 104) shows that he was actually paid for 2041;4 
hours of overtime in 1962 in addition to his having been 
allowed 33.1 days off from work on holidays, vacation 
and jury duty. Exhibit 104 shows that Don Chiodo was 
actually off work and on vacation over 15 days in 1962 
and the company policy would permit him only 15 days 
of vacation (R. 418). In addition to his days away 
from work, the overtime paid him and his claim that he 
was doing subcontract work for Max Fonnesbeck for 
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which he received at least $3,700 over a period of a year 
and a half makes his excuse for falsification of payroll 
records incredible and beyond belief. 
The statement "that there was nothing wrongful 
or hidden with respect to Don Chiodo's taking nine days 
off" and that Vincent Chiodo had a "clear conscience 
and freedom from guilt" (Br. 25-26) all because he had 
often told his employees he would have a court battle 
over his employment contract and that they should tell 
the truth if called as witnesses is indeed remarkable. 
Clearly Vincent Chiodo felt that he was in the right in 
everything he did. He apparently believed that he could 
sell his company and continue to exercise the same con-
trol over the company as manager for a new owner as 
he did while manager for himself. This attitude is demon-
strated by the following statement from respondent's 
brief (p. 33) : 
"Plaintiff did become exercised on several 
occasions because of the irritations that developed 
as a result of New London's interference and 
failure to permit him to manage the company 
as had been agreed. Under all of the circum-
stances it appeared that plaintiff exercised a 
remarkable amount of restraint." 
There can be little doubt that a great deal of the friction 
between Vincent Chiodo and the other officers of Bear 
River Telephone Company was a result of his feeling 
that he had the right to do as he pleased with the company 
without control or direction from the owners of the 
company. There was no such right granted Vincent 
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Chiodo, but his assumption that his employment contract 
gave him such right may help to explain how he could 
rationalize to the point where he convinced himself that 
all his problems were caused by the fact that his superiors 
informed him from time to time how they desired the 
company to be operated. 
On pages 26-29 of his brief, respondent once again 
attempts to prove a given fact by connecting unrelated 
statements made as to separate unrelated facts or occur-
rences together as if they were related. This is equivalent 
to a Bible reader finding a statement that "Cain slew 
Abel" and an admonition by Christ that one should "go 
and do likewise" and prove by that that Christ approved 
of murder. Steve Anderson testified (R. 353-355) that 
he helped splice aerial cable shown on Exhibit 58. This 
cable was at plant 78 as identified by Mr. Fonnesbeck 
(R. 226). Plaintiff's reply brief reports the testimony 
of Don Chiodo relative to Exhibit 53 (R. 543-545) 
which related to underground conduit installation at 
the Thiokol R & D plant and argues that because Don 
Chiodo testified that he did some correction of the 
Henkels-McCoy splicing with company help on com-
pany time that the testimony of Steve Anderson is 
"unsupported by any evidence, is false, for the testi-
mony established that the cable splicing was not part of 
the Fonnesbeck contract at all .... " The underground 
conduit at the R & D plant had nothing to do with 
splicing aerial cable at plant 78 about which Steve 
Anderson testified and for which splicing Max Fonnes-
beck paid Don Chiodo $2,000.00 (R. 230). The plain 
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fact is that there is no competent evidence to show that 
Steve Anderson did not do exactly what he said he did, 
i.e., help Don Chiodo, on Bear River Telephone Com-
pany time, splice the aerial cable at plant 78 which was 
under contract to Max Fonnesbeck and under subcon-
tract to Don Chiodo for splicing. 
On page 29 of his brief, respondent attempts to 
excuse Vincent Chiodo causing the company to pay his 
14-year-old granddaughter $354.20 for delivering tele-
phone directories that were delivered by Don Chiodo 
and his wife while Don Chiodo was on Bear River 
Telephone Company time by alleging that Mr. Warner 
had himself delivered directories for Bear River Tele-
phone Company and had been paid. What plaintiff 
forgets is that Mr. Warner did his delivery on his own 
time and that even if he had done it on Bear River 
Telephone Company time it would not excuse Vincent 
Chiodo from paying his granddaughter for doing work 
which Don Chiodo did on company time. 
While respondent accuses appellant of making 
baseless accusations (Br. 27), of beating a "hasty re-
treat" from a previous position (Br. 26), of "despera-
tion" in attempts to justify respondent's discharge (Br. 
29) and of dredging up evidence (Br. 23), it is sub-
mitted that such claims - with no support in any evi-
dence-should not be a substitute for an examination of 
the facts. 
13 
B. Instructions From Donald Bell. 
It is untrue that defendant ever abandoned the 
defense of the failure of Vincent Chiodo to comply with 
instructions from Mr. Bell as one of the bases for the 
discharge of Vincent Chiodo as alleged on page 23 of 
respondent's brief. Also, it did not affirmatively appear 
from any of the evidence that Vincent Chiodo had sub-
stantially complied with said instructions. The testimony 
of Mr. Bell revealed that Vincent Chiodo never answered 
his letter but that he had his attorney, Calvin Rampton, 
write a letter for him in which general propositions were 
set forth giving no bona fide explanation of what was 
requested ( R. 170; 178-182) . 
One of the items requested by Mr. Bell's letter 
(Ex. 46, para. 6} was an explanation of why Thiokol 
had not been billed for approximately $1,500.00 in 
additional charges for WATS service retroactive to 
June 6, 1963. These are the same charges about which 
Mr. Warner testified that Vincent Chiodo instructed 
him to furnish no inf orma ti on to New London ( R. 439) : 
"Q. As a result of this letter you received, 
what did you do? 
"A. I took the letter to Mr. Chiodo. 
"Q. What did he say? 
"A. He said that anything pertaining to the 
watts bands charges was to be referred directly 
to him, that I was to make no communication 
to anyone in New London regarding them." 
and also about which Vincent Chiodo said (R. 444) : 
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" ... if they can't figure out that they are 
losing or making money from those figures, that 
that was their fa ult, that it didn't mean anything 
to us here." 
As the preparation for the trial of this lawsuit 
revealed even stronger justification for the discharge 
of Vincent Chiodo than his failure to furnish the infor-
mation demanded by Mr. Bell, defendant has naturally 
placed primary emphasis on its strongest points and has 
not placed great emphasis on what would otherwise be 
ample justification for Vincent Chiodo's discharge. This 
is in no way an abandonment by Bear River Telephone 
Company of the defense based upon the default of Vin-
cent Chiodo in failing to furnish the information sought 
by Mr. Bell. 
C. Condonation Of Respondent's Insubordination. 
On pages 31 and 32 of his brief, respondent quotes 
from Am. J ur. to the effect that retention of an em-
ployee after actual discovery of an act of misconduct 
will in some circumstances amount to condoning the act. 
In some circumstances this may well be true, but in the 
case of Vincent Chiodo those acts which were discovered 
before commencement of this lawsuit were never con-
doned 1 and it was only because of remarkable forebear-
ance that Vincent Chiodo was not terminated long 
before he was. The letter of Mr. Butcher (Ex. 25) 
clearly states that if Vincent Chiodo continued to fail 
to obey orders and continued to foment trouble he would 
be fired. There is certainly nothing in the record of this 
1 See e.g., Ex. 11, 25, 28, 30, 32, 34, 46, 49. 
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case to indicate that Vincent Chiodo's actions were con. 
doned. On the contrary, there were warnings given with 
respect to each infraction, culminating when Vincent 
Chiodo was discharged because Mr. Bell finally became 
convinced that "he was impossible to live with. . .. 
Impossible for anybody to get along with" ( R. 176). 
This action was not taken until all efforts to obtain the 
cooperation of Vincent Chiodo had failed (R. 171-176). 
The reluctance of Bear River to take the final step of 
discharge, despite Chiodo's deliberate provocations, was 
not condonation but out of consideration for the per· 
sonal relationship of Chiodo and his family to the com-
pany. For plaintiff to claim condonation in such cir· 
cumstances does indeed put strain upon the quality of 
mercy. 
D. Disclosure Of Confidential Information. 
On pages 36 and 37 of his brief, respondent states 
that Vincent Chiodo was justified in advising the Public 
Service Commission of Utah and the R.E.A. of pending 
negotiations between Mountain States Telephone and 
Telegraph Company and General Waterworks Corpo-
ration for the exchange of Bear River Telephone Com· 
pany. Mr. Chiodo testified (R. 40-41) that he went to a 
meeting in Denver at the request of Mr. Sanders where 
he was informed of the pending negotiations. He testi-
fied in pertinent part (R. 40-41): 
"A. 'Ve were informed by Mr. Sanders that 
his firm had found it convenient to trade the 
property to A. T. & T., who in turn had con· 
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tacted Mountain States Telephone and Tele-
graph Com1;mny for some sort of a trade; that 
the Mountam States Company would take over 
all of the employees except Vincent Chiodo, and 
that he was through. 
"Q. What did you say? 
"A. I was shocked and I recall saying under 
my breath and-
"Q. Well, now what did you say to them? I 
don't care what you said under your breath. 
"A. I didn't say anything to them. 
"Q. Well, just tell me what you said. 
"A. Other than that I would be willing to co-
operate, that I suppose my contract could be 
compromised, but received no further comment." 
While Vincent Chiodo said nothing about Mr. Sanders' 
agreement to honor the contract, Mr. Bell testified with-
out contradiction that this information was given to 
Vincent Chiodo by both Mr. Sanders and Mr. Bell. 
Mr. Bell testified (R. 109-110): 
"Q. Now in this conversation when it was 
made clear to Mr. Chiodo that if the exchange 
were made with the Mountain States people that 
they probably wouldn't want him, was anything 
said to him by either you or Mr. Sanders with 
respect to what you would do on his contract? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. What was said? 
"A. I recall that Mr. Sanders made the 
statement to Mr. Vince Chiodo, in outlining the 
possible exchange of properties, that it would 
17 
not be possible for Mountain States or that 
Mountain States would not be interested in tak-
ing Mr. Chiodo, Mr. Vince Chiodo, with the 
trade. But that he would see or that we would 
see, Bear River Telephone Company would see . ' I assume he meant, that his contract was hon. 
ored. And I recall myself assuring him of this 
before the meeting broke up, before we sepa-
rated." 
Mr. Bell also testified that this same information was 
communicated to Mr. Rampton, Vincent Chiodo's law-
yer (R. 111-112): 
"Q. Now why didn't you tell me when I called 
you on the phone that you'd take care of .Mr. 
Chiodo? 
"A. Certainly it was my recollection that we 
didn't leave any doubt in your mind that we had 
every intention of observing our contract with 
Mr. Chiodo. I have no other recollection. 
"Q. Weren't our negotiations pretty much on 
a 'maybe we will and maybe we won't' basis when 
you and I broke off? 
"A. Not to my recollection, sir. 
"Q. It's your recollection that that you gave 
me assurance that the -
"A. That we would observe his contract. 
"Q. Wasn't it a fact that what you said to me, 
'Well, we might have to'? 
"A. No, I think what I said to you was, '"Te 
have no choice, and we have no intention of doing 
otherwise'.'' 
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It was obviously not fears for his employment con-
tract which caused Chiodo to run to the R.E.A. and the 
Public Service Commission of Utah contrary to express 
instructions from his superiors, but a desire to prevent 
the trade with Mountain States Telephone and Tele-
graph Company - a matter which did not concern him 
in light of Sanders' commitment to honor his employ-
ment contract. 
E. Disloyalty. 
On page 38 of his brief, respondent attempts to 
excuse his underhanded attempt to act as agent for a 
third party in a negotiation with his principal by asking 
to whom he owed loyalty as manager of Bear River. 
Respondent concludes that as manager of Bear River 
"the attempted purchase of stock from General Water-
works Corporation was not a breach of any responsibility 
that plaintiff might owe as manager of Bear River Tele-
phone Company." It is obvious that respondent still does 
not believe that as a company officer and director his 
responsibility and fiduciary duty is to the corporate 
shareholders. See, e.g., Elggren v. Woolley, 64 Utah 
183, 228 Pac. 906 (1924); Glen Allen Mimng Co. v. 
Park Galena Mimng Co., 77 Utah 362, 296 Pac. 231 
( 1931) . The shareholder of Bear River Telephone Com-
pany was General Waterworks Corporation. 
It is recognized that Vincent Chiodo had a deep 
emotional involvement in the Bear River Telephone 
Company and that he had a strong resentment against 
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph. It is under-
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standable that Vincent Chiodo would, in looking to hi) 
own desires, do everything he could to prevent the Bear 
River Telephone Company from passing to a compan» 
which he had been fighting many years. 'Vhat plaintiff 
forgets is that after he disposes of his property he has no 
legal right to control its destiny from that point on. His 
excuse that he went to the Utah Public Service Com-
mission and the R.E.A. "to find out what the legalities 
might be on that" is simply not true. He went to his 
attorney to see about the "legalities" and he went to the 
Utah Public Service Commission and the R.E.A. to 
block the contemplated transfer. If the contemplated 
transfer had taken place, Vincent Chiodo would have his 
employment contract honored as was told him by .Mr. 
Sanders and Mr. Bell and he had no right to attempt to 
satisfy his own desires as to the ownership of Bear River 
Telephone Company once he had sold it to General 
Waterworks. 
Plaintiff alleges (Br. 38-39) that Vincent Chiodo 
not only wanted to protect himself but "also clearly 
wished to preserve Bear River Telephone Company and 
insure that it would be owned and operated by a respon-
sible organization." As a resident of the Tremonton 
area, he may have had such an interest but his over-
riding obligation to Bear River Telephone Company 
was to the actual owners of Bear River Telephone Com-
pany and his obligation was not to take it upon himself 
to find an owner more suitable to his own interest. His 
interference in the Mountain States negotiations and 
his attempt to buy the company for Independent Tele-
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phone Company are but two instances of Vincent 
Chiodo's volatile nature and effort to do what he wished 
in utter disregard of his duties to his employer, demon-
strated over and over again in the record in this case. 
IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S ORIGINAL 
DECISION WITH RESPECT TO APPLICA-
TION OF THE PAROLE EVIDENCE RULE 
TO THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT IN 
ISSUE WAS CORRECT. 
Beginning on page 47 of his brief, respondent sets 
forth his contention that the employment agreement in 
this case can be varied by parole evidence and cites 
cases which he contends support his contention. None 
of the cited cases are in point here. The reason that 
these cases are inapposite is that there is no basis for con-
tention in the present case that the written contract was 
ambiguous or susceptible of more than one construction. 
In Read v. Forced Underfiring Corp., 82 Utah 
529, 26 P.2d 325 (1933), this Court bottomed its right 
to look to the circumstances at the time the contract was 
entered into because of the use of the term "net profits" 
in the contract which term the Court felt was ambiguous. 
Respondent in this case refers to no language in the 
written agreement which is ambiguous or which he 
believes to mean something different from what appel-
lant believes it to mean. However, at page 51 of his brief, 
respondent points to the language "to confirm our 
understanding ... " and argues out that "confirm" 
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means "to complete or establish that which was incom-
plete or uncertain .... " Appellant agrees with this mean-
ing. However, the contention by respondent that tlus 
language can be interpreted to incorporate by reference 
all the prior negotiations whether written or oral is not 
supported by any authority cited by him. 
In Hawaiian Equipment Company v. Eimco Corp., 
115 Utah 590, 207 P.2d 794 (1949) there was some 
question as to the identification of goods covered by the 
contract and this Court said that parole evidence may 
be received "for a limited purpose." That purpose was 
to "apply the memorandum to the subject matter." 
In Maw v. Noble, IO Utah 2d 440, 354 P.2d 121 
( 1960) this Court stated: 
"We are in agreement with the well-recog-
nized rule urged by the defendants that where 
there is uncertainty or ambiguity the contract 
should be strictly construed against him who 
draws it. But it is to be kept in mind that this 
rule applies only where there is some genuine 
lack of certainty, and not too strained or merely 
fanciful or wishful interpretations that may be 
indulged in. The primary and a more funda-
mental rule is that the contract must be looked 
at realistically in the light of the circumstances 
under which it was entered into, and if the intent 
of the parties can be ascertained with reasonable 
certainty it must be given effect." (P. 123.) 
The case of Ross v. Stricker, 275 P.2d 991 (Okla. 
1953) is concerned only with the question of whether the 
period of an agreement may be proven by parole evi-
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dence where no duration is stated in the writing. The 
court held, with one strong dissent, that because the 
writing in issue was only a memorandum of a prior oral 
agreement and was not a contract, parole evidence of 
the duration of the contract was admissible. The present 
case does not involve any question concerning the dura-
tion of the employment agreement and is not a mere 
written memorandum of a prior agreement. The agree-
ment at issue in this case is the only contract entered 
into by the parties. 
In Laskey v. Rubell Corp., 100 N.E.2d 140 (Ct. 
App. N.Y., 1951), the court determined that the con-
tract in question was partly oral and partly written 
because the parties had actually entered into an oral 
contract and then later reduced a portion of the agree-
ment to writing. The writing was entitled "Terms and 
Conditions of Employment" and was signed by the 
parties. The written document stated that the employ-
ment contract was "terminable, at any time, at the 
option of the Company" but the plaintiff desired to 
prove that the oral agreement was for employment for 
one year. The court ruled that parole evidence could not 
be introduced to vary the written agreement and then 
in dictum stated that the portion of the oral contract 
which was not reduced to writing could be proven by 
parole evidence if there were any dispute about the terms 
of the oral agreement. The holding and dictum of the 
Laskey case are of no importance in the present case 
because there never was an oral contract between the 
parties hereto and the written contract is the only agree-
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ment ever entered into by them. Even if General 'V ater. 
works Corporation were the party defendant, which 
it is not, there is no evidence that the parties entered into 
an oral contract prior to the execution of the employ. 
ment agreement. 
It may well be that both respondent and appellant 
agree as to the law governing parole evidence, but differ 
as to its application here. Respondent points to no am-
biguity in the written agreement (Ex. 6) but relies as 
did the court below (R. 589) when it reversed its earlier 
conclusion ( R. 584) on the use of the word "confirm" 
in the second paragraph of Exhibit 6. It is submitted 
that the phrase in its context and the quoted definition 
from Black's Law Dictionary clearly connote the letter 
is intended as an integration of all earlier oral "under-
standings'' - the classic example of the application of 
the parole evidence rule. A reading of the rest of the 
letter agreement "confirms" this intent. It covers all the 
essentials of the employment arrangement - terms, 
duties and salary. The last paragraph of the letter 
proper and the acceptance below "reconfirm" that intent. 
Any attempt to conjure an ambiguity or patent omission 
of an essential term can only make a mockery of the 
rule and its purpose. The original decision of the trial 
court (R. 584) was sound on this point. Bullock v. Des-
eret Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 11 Utah 2d l, 354 P.2d 
559, 563 (1960). 
V. THE ALLEGED MALICE OF DE· 
FENDANT IS NOT AN ISSUE IN THIS 
CASE. 
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Respondent in his so-called "Statement of Facts" 
(Br. 19) claims the discharge of Vincent Chiodo's two 
sons demonstrate malice and bad faith on the part of 
defendant. Such charge is groundless. Vincent Chiodo's 
sons had no vested rights of employment and their con-
tinued employment was at the pleasure of the employer. 
Held v. American Linen Supply Co., 6 Utah 2d 106 
307 P.2d 210 (1957); Bullock v. Deseret Dodge Truck 
Center, II Utah 2d l, 354 P.2d 559. Respondent points 
out that their work was not criticized and they were fired 
because they were "fomenting trouble" and not because 
their work was unsatisfactory as stated on the termina-
tion slip. It is hard to imagine how an individual's work 
could be more unsatisfactory than when he is fomenting 
trouble. Vincent Chiodo commenced this very action 
against the Bear River Telephone Company on January 
9, 1964, yet his sons were retained until March 13, 1964, 
when it became apparent that the sons' loyalty was 
more to Vincent Chiodo than it was to the company. 
They had to be terminated in order to continue the 
company's business without involving the employees 
in problems with the Chiodo family. 
The letter of James L. Morrison to Mr. Calvin L. 
Rampton, which plaintiff also cites as showing malice, 
was a letter from one attorney to another in which 
terminology common among lawyers was used. It is 
commonly said by lawyers that a witness is "destroyed" 
by certain evidence. Respondent in this case, while mak-
ing accusations that appellant is desperately attempting 
to justify its discharge of Vincent Chiodo, is himself 
doing exactly what he accuses appellant of doing. To 
attempt to color the motives of appellant by claims of 
malice and bad faith because of a letter from one attorney 
to another is certainly grasping at straws. The testimony 
of James L. Morrison confirms that he was merely 
referring to the belief that proof of Vincent Chiodo's 
activities would destroy his reputation for honesty and 
integrity which he presumably had in the community. 
Finally, plaintiff's claim of malice was rejected by 
the trial court and he has taken no appeal from that 
ruling. To raise it here is a mere red herring directed to 
plaintiff's emotional reactions rather than to the issues 
before this Court. 
CONCLUSION 
A review of the record in this case amply demon· 
strates that appellant established just cause for the dis-
charge of Vincent Chiodo. The general conclusions cap· 
tioned "Findings of Fact" are not supported by the 
record and the trial court's theories in support of its 
conclusion are contrary to law. The judgment below 
should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PETER W. BILLINGS 
DALE E. ANDERSON 
Fabian & Clendenin 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
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